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iThis paper explores the hitherto futile quest for developing disciplines on the trade- and investment-distorting effects of services 
subsidies. It sheds light on the multiplicity of factors that have weighed on the conduct of negotiations on subsidy disciplines in a 
services trade context at both the global and preferential levels and advances a few thoughts on what the future may hold for the 
adoption of such disciplines. The analysis suggests that it is rather unlikely that WTO Members will any time soon reach a consensus 
on the matter of subsidy disciplines for services beyond those that currently (and timidly) obtain in the GATS and in many preferential 
trade agreements. The main reason behind such a conclusion stems from a marked rise in the value of preserving policy space in a 
trading environment characterized by considerably greater global market contestability than two decades ago. 
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1INTRODUCTION
This is notably so under the GATS as Members can opt to keep entire 
sectors out of their schedule of commitments in areas where the political 
demand for preserving policy space is typically strongest. In such instances, 
the GATS yields no analytical insights whatsoever on the nature of 
restrictive or discriminatory practices maintained, including on sector-
speciﬁc subsidy practices.   
Poretti (2009: 253).
In a few GATS schedules (for example, Czech Republic, Iceland, and 
Slovenia), it is clearly indicated that such support programs must meet 
speciﬁc origin criteria.
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Twenty years have passed since the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round and the creation of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). One of the Round’s landmark 
achievements was without doubt the creation of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), setting in 
motion a process of progressive market opening in a sector 
of sustained trade and investment vibrancy and one that 
dominates output and employment in the economies of 
the vast majority of WTO Members. Yet even landmark 
achievements can feature a few loose ends. As it happens, 
the creation of the GATS, a process that started literally from 
a blank multilateral page, featured quite a few loose ends, 
not least in disciplines targeting the potentially trade- and 
investment-distorting effects of subsidy practices. 
The issue of subsidy disciplines, for which GATS Article 
XV has served as a place holder, alongside discussions on 
emergency safeguards (Article X), government procurement 
(Article XIII), and the development of a necessity test for 
non-discriminatory domestic regulatory measures (Article 
VI:4) took a backseat in the negotiations and was left 
to be addressed in the years following the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round. Although Art. XV does not feature 
any speciﬁc deadline to conclude negotiations on the 
development of multilateral disciplines on services subsidies, 
there is scant progress to report on this issue since the end 
of the Uruguay Round. In fact, none of the Uruguay Round’s 
“leftover agenda” described above has yet to generate a 
multilateral consensus, such that 14 years into the Doha 
Development Agenda, trade negotiators are still prosecuting 
the Uruguay Round in the area of services trade. Such rule-
making stasis offers a ﬁrst, insightful, signal regarding both 
the inherent technical complexity of the GATS’s unﬁnished 
rule-making agenda and the starkness of differences in 
collective preferences towards these issues among the 
WTO’s increasingly diverse membership.
This paper explores the quest for developing disciplines on 
services subsidies. It sheds light on the multiplicity of factors 
that have weighed on the conduct of negotiations on subsidy 
disciplines in a services trade context (at both the global and 
preferential levels) and advances a few thoughts on what the 
future may hold for the adoption of such disciplines. 
The analysis suggests that it is rather unlikely that WTO 
Members will any time soon reach a consensus on the 
matter of subsidy disciplines for services beyond those that 
currently (and timidly) obtain in the GATS and in many 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The main reason 
behind such a conclusion stems from a marked rise in the 
value of preserving policy space in a trading environment 
characterized by considerably greater global market 
contestability than two decades ago. 
The paper ﬁrst explores state practices in services 
subsidies, including preferred sectors of application and 
the various forms subsidies take across the service sector’s 
heterogeneous landscape. It then recalls how the existing 
GATS framework already (if somewhat obliquely) addresses 
the issue of services subsidies, chieﬂy through the most-
favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) 
provisions. The paper goes on to explore the current state of 
negotiations under the mandate of GATS Art. XV, offering a 
deeper analysis of the factors that have conspired to torpedo 
the fulﬁlment of the agreed negotiating mandate. It further 
examines whether the rising inﬂuence of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in services markets may alter the ongoing 
conversation on subsidy disciplines in the sector before 
advancing a number of forward-looking thoughts by way of 
conclusion. 
Limited empirical or even qualitative information on subsidy 
practices in services is available in the economic literature 
or in WTO-related documents. From a sectoral point of 
view, and based on the admittedly imperfect insights that 
GATS schedules1 or the lists of non-conforming measures 
appended to PTAs proceeding on a negative list basis 
provide, subsidies seem to be most prevalent in audio-visual 
(mainly by developed countries), transport (all modes), 
tourism (mainly by developing countries), and ﬁnancial 
services.2 An overview of GATS schedules reveals that 
almost half of those containing MFN exemptions have listed 
measures granting the beneﬁt of support programmes or 
adopted for the implementation of beneﬁts in conformity 
with support programmes to audio-visual works and suppliers 
of such works.3 
GATS schedules of commitments further reveal that 
national treatment limitations conditioned on the size of 
targeted beneﬁciaries mostly concern subsidies under Mode 
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2defers repayment terms or allows for a longer period 
to pay off the loan, as well as government guarantees, 
which occur when a government guarantees loans taken 
by companies or individuals through commercial banks. 
(vii) Hybrid subsidies, which refer primarily to instruments 
that exploit the tax system to lower the costs of private 
investment. 
(viii) Derivative subsidies, which include sympathetic 
support, compensatory or countervailing support, and 
subsidy clusters. 
(ix) Subsidies through government procurement, which 
refer to beneﬁts conferred by governments when 
purchasing goods and/or services.7
The WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews (TPR) also provide useful 
indications on the most prevalent forms of governmental 
support schemes. A quick overview of the 220 TPR reports 
completed to date shows that most governments prefer tax 
incentives (that is, income foregone) to direct grants (that is, 
expenditures).
Subsidy programs serve various policy aims. Export-
enhancing subsidies aim, as their name implies, at increasing 
the value of a country’s services exports. However, by 
recurring to this type of subsidy, a distortion in the market 
may occur insofar as like services and service suppliers from 
third countries can be displaced. Import-displacing subsidies, 
on the other hand, aim at reducing the level of imported 
services. Such practices can result in a distortion of the 
market that will favour subsidised domestic suppliers over 
their ineligible foreign competitors. 
A further type of subsidy commonly encountered in services 
trade—so-called investment-diverting subsidies—serve 
the purpose of attracting (and retaining) investments to 
the subsidizing country. Following Dunning’s (1994, 2002) 
pioneering work, foreign direct investment (FDI) can be 
distinguished into four distinct categories according to the 
investing ﬁrm’s chief motivations—(i) natural resource-
seeking; (ii) market-seeking; (iii) efﬁciency-seeking; and (iv) 
strategic asset-seeking (or innovation-seeking) FDI (which 
can be seen as a subset of efﬁciency-seeking investment in 
3 (commercial presence).4 A few WTO Members, notably 
Mexico and Ukraine, have inscribed limitations in their 
schedules that restrict the granting of subsidies to small- and 
medium-sized domestic enterprises.5 
A closer look at GATS schedules of commitments further 
shows that subsidy-related limitations are mostly inscribed 
in the horizontal section of schedules, thus applying across 
all committed sectors, rather than being sector-speciﬁc. Out 
of almost 120 WTO Member schedules featuring horizontal 
commitments, more than one-third include limitations 
on subsidies, either by retaining full freedom to introduce 
or maintain subsidies inconsistent with market access or 
NT commitments, or by limiting their use to a speciﬁc 
nationality or group of companies (that is, small ﬁrms). 
Most of the GATS schedules mentioned from which the 
above information is drawn make a speciﬁc reference to 
the term “subsidy/ies,” although a few WTO Members use 
a more general wording, such as “some kind of incentives/
assistance” (for example, Kuwait and Qatar). It should be 
noted that, for the purposes of developing disciplines on 
services subsidies, other GATS schedules, whose entries in 
the horizontal section refer to tax exemptions or other ﬁscal 
incentives, could be relevant as these measures might also 
imply the granting of a ﬁnancial advantage.6
Work by researchers at the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) has helped to identify and 
deﬁne several types of subsidy practices affecting cross-
border activity. These range from ﬁnancial contributions to 
in-kind support. The IISD identiﬁes nine different types of 
subsidies. 
(i) Grants and other direct payments, which involve 
mainly time-limited payments or payments enabling a 
company or an individual to cover general costs or the 
costs of undertaking a speciﬁc economic activity. 
(ii) Market price support, which can be deﬁned as transfers 
of money to producers that are provided through the 
market as a result of policies that raise prices artiﬁcially. 
(iii) Tax concessions, which consist of all subsidies provided 
by reducing companies’ tax burdens, such as tax 
exemptions, tax burdens, tax credits, and tax deferrals. 
(iv) In-kind subsidies, which refer to a range of beneﬁts that 
are provided in a form other than money. 
(v) Cross-subsidies, which consist of market transfers 
brought by discriminatory pricing practices within the 
scope of activity of the same enterprise or agency. 
(vi) Credit subsidies, which refer to loans made by a 
government to a company at a lower rate of interest 
than a commercial bank would offer, or when the 
government requires less collateral to back its loan, 
Adlung and Soprana (2013: 45).
Mexico reserves the right to grant research and development (R&D) 
subsidies and incentives exclusively to small service enterprises owned by 
Mexican nationals, whereas Ukraine’s schedule stipulates that the eligibility 
for subsidies and other forms of state support, including access to the 
ﬁnancial and other material resources of the state, may be limited to small 
business enterprises.
WTO Document S/WPGR/W/13/Add.1, p. 1.
Steenblik (2007: 18–26).
4
5
6
7
3industries with innovation-rich characteristics).8 Although 
the bulk of FDI (both stocks and ﬂows) in services was 
long primarily market-seeking in character, given the need 
for greater product tailoring in many service markets, the 
new geography of global value chain (GVC)-driven trade 
and FDI emerging from the fragmentation of production 
of both goods and services has seen host countries direct 
increasing attention to measures designed to attract and 
retain efﬁciency-seeking FDI in service markets. Here, 
competitiveness considerations involve a host of factors such 
as the quality of transport and communication infrastructure 
and of regulatory institutions, the ease of doing business, 
the ready availability of skills, the adequacy of intellectual 
property (IP) protection, and so on.9  
Host country governments resort to various policy 
instruments with a view to attracting and retaining FDI, 
from tax incentives to direct subsidies, notably of an 
infrastructural character or targeted at worker training. 
Once more, distortions in the allocation of investment 
may occur as capital can be diverted from countries that 
could potentially obtain such investments in the absence 
of government support measures. Beggar-thy-neighbour 
conduct, including locational competition between the sub-
national entities of individual WTO Members, is arguably 
more pronounced in the realm of investment than in 
trade. This has resulted in a clear, and recurring, revealed 
preference for regulatory inaction across the full spectrum 
of international investment instruments concluded in recent 
decades, including those embedded in PTAs (Box 1).10
Early discussions held within the GATS Working Party on 
GATS Rules (WPGR) under the Art. XV post-Uruguay Round 
negotiating mandate provided insights on the types of 
subsidies WTO Members considered as most affecting trade 
in services. Based on the objectives of government support 
programs, WTO Members identiﬁed four different types of 
services subsidies, 
(i) production; 
(ii) investment; 
(iii) export; and 
(iv) consumption subsidies.14  
Production subsidies, which, as their name suggests, aim at 
stimulating the production of services, were seen as most 
likely to impact competitive conditions under Mode 1 (cross-
border supply) even if granted under Modes 3 (commercial 
presence) and 4 (temporary movement of service suppliers), 
because cross-border suppliers would be competing 
against subsidized like domestic suppliers.15 In the case of 
investment subsidies, whose chief purpose is to attract FDI 
in the subsidy-granting country, government intervention 
was deemed to impact only one mode of supply, that is, 
commercial presence (Mode 3), though one could easily see 
a link to the scope for increased imports of various categories 
of Mode 4 key personnel that a subsidized investment could 
generate.16 As for export subsidies made contingent on 
export performance, such measures could affect like foreign 
suppliers operating under Mode 3 if these were not eligible 
for the subsidy.17 Finally, consumption subsidies might be 
found in violation of the NT obligation of GATS (Article XVII), 
for committed sectors, when they are granted contingent on 
purchases from national sources.18 
BOX 1:
Box 1: Investment Incentives
Investment incentives are “measurable economic advantages that governments provide to speciﬁc enterprises (or groups 
of enterprises) with the goal of steering investment into favored sectors or regions or of inﬂuencing the character of such 
investments.”11 Thus, investment incentives, which can be of a ﬁscal or non-ﬁscal nature, can be considered as investment-related 
subsidies aimed at attracting (and retaining) foreign investments.12 In services trade parlance, such practices target the commercial 
presence form of delivering services to host country markets. Like other forms of subsidies, investment incentives, which are often 
closely related to the imposition of performance requirements, can exert trade- and investment-distorting effects.13 However, 
unlike most forms of support programs typically under review in discussions of subsidy disciplines, investment incentives 
speciﬁcally tend to involve positive discrimination towards like foreign service suppliers, affording foreign investors better than 
national treatment in many circumstances. 
OECD (2005: 9).
CUTS (2002: 24).
CUTS (2002: 25).
Sauvé (2008: 29).
WTO document S/WPGR/W/9, para 31.
WTO document S/WPGR/W/9, para 33.
James (2009: 1).
WTO document S/WPGR/W/9, paras 31–34.
Sauvé (2002 : 330).
WTO document S/WPGR/W/9, para 32.
WTO document S/WPGR/W/9, para 34.
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4Subsidies can also be distinguished according to how they 
are granted. In an early submission to the WPGR, the 
government of Chile argued that subsidies could take either 
of two forms—(i) direct or indirect ﬁnancial contributions by 
a government or public body, along deﬁnitional lines found 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM); or (ii) incentives to commercial presence, that is 
incentives used to attract FDI.19 Chile also pointed out that 
monopoly rights and restrictive trade practices could also 
provide beneﬁciaries with artiﬁcial advantages tantamount 
to those deriving from subsidies.20 Such observations appear 
particularly relevant in a services context, where domestic 
regulation, both discriminatory and non-discriminatory, 
plays such a dominant role in determining effective access to 
markets. 
It is once more highly revealing that WTO Members have 
generally eschewed deﬁnitional boundaries that might confer 
subsidy-like properties to domestic regulatory measures—
for example, prudential measures in ﬁnancial markets. Such 
aversion to an expanded deﬁnition of the term “subsidy” in a 
services context must be understood against the background 
of the considerably greater inﬂuence that “vertical” (that 
is, sector-speciﬁc) communities of powerful regulatory 
agencies have traditionally exercised over the development, 
interpretation, or expansion of the GATS (an observation that 
obtains equally in a PTA setting; Box 2).
BOX 2:
Financial Market Bailouts and Competition Policy: EU and US Approaches 
The global ﬁnancial crisis impacted the banking systems of the United States (US) and most European Union (EU) Members very 
strongly, forcing governments to bail out several ﬁnancial institutions in the banking, securities, and insurance business, including 
a number of large institutions deemed of systemic importance to global ﬁnancial markets, in an attempt to avoid a ﬁnancial 
meltdown through contagion effects in highly interconnected ﬁnancial markets and to restore ﬁnancial stability. The EU, faced 
with the need to widen the scope of its state aid policy, presented a communication in 2008 on the application of state aid rules 
to measures taken in relation to ﬁnancial institutions in the context of the ﬁnancial crisis (the Banking Communication). This 
document established a framework for state aid approval by the Commission and a series of ad hoc competition policy measures 
in the banking system.21 The Banking Communication was founded on Art. 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), which recognizes that state aid can be used to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. 
The global ﬁnancial crisis was deemed to fall within the scope of Art. 107 TFEU, thereby qualifying the context as justifying the 
implementation of ad hoc measures deemed necessary to restore ﬁnancial stability. In response to possible competition concerns, 
the Banking Communication pointed out the proportionate and temporary nature of state interventions and the need for states to 
unwind their actions as soon as market circumstances permitted for a competitive and efﬁcient European banking sector to emerge 
from the crisis.22 The Communication further clariﬁed that safeguards were necessary against possible abuses and distortions of 
competition resulting from recapitalization schemes.23 Thus, according to the EU, the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 showed that it would 
be unwise to introduce a total prohibition of state aid in the ﬁnancial sector.24 
Contrary to the EU, the US does not have a body of law that speciﬁcally regulates ﬁnancial aid provided by governments to 
ﬁrms, as the remit of competition law focuses exclusively on the prosecution of private anti-competitive conduct.25 However, in 
exceptional circumstances, such as the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, the US government did intervene in the market by providing 
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial assistance (that is, bailouts) to a few beleaguered ﬁnancial institutions, a measure deemed necessary and in the 
interest of the general public to guarantee the stability and integrity of the country’s (and the world’s) ﬁnancial system given the 
systemic importance of the private operators involved.26 Such interventions, however, were subject to time and scope limitations to 
reduce the possible negative effects on competition arising from granting ﬁnancial assistance to a certain group of US ﬁrms. Similar 
to its EU counterparts, the US government’s approach to the ﬁnancial crisis seems to indicate a shared Transatlantic reluctance 
to embrace a blanket prohibition of state support in ﬁnancial services as certain market failures provide a justiﬁable rationale for 
government intervention. 
WTO document S/WPGR/W/10, p. 1.
WTO document S/WPGR/W/10, p. 1.
Govani (2015).
Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union, C 270, 25 Oct 2008, p. 9.
OECD (2010: 2).
Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union, C 270, 25 Oct 2008, p. 4. 
OECD (2010: 2).
Van der Wee (2011); Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union, C 270, 25 Oct 
2008, p. 10.
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5An overview of TPR reports provides more useful insights on 
the different forms of governmental assistance in services 
markets, which WTO reports have conceptualized using the 
following analytical distinctions. 
(i) Direct transfers of funds, including grants, loans and 
equity infusions; 
(ii) potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities, for 
example, loan guarantees;
(iii) government revenue foregone; 
(iv) supply of goods and services other than general 
infrastructure; purchase of goods; 
(v) payments to funding mechanisms; and
(vi) income and price support.27 
Transfer pricing (or tax optimization) mechanisms allow for 
goods and services given (or received) by different companies 
within the same group to be priced so as to obtain ﬁscal 
beneﬁts from the different ﬁscal regimes of the countries 
where the companies have their domicile.28 In other words, 
they allow companies to allocate proﬁts and taxes across 
different parts of a company by taking advantage of the 
different ﬁscal regimes across the different countries where 
various parts of the company are domiciled.29 Although not 
illegal per se,30 as countries are entitled to offer companies 
tax breaks and speciﬁc tax arrangements to encourage 
economic activity,31 transfer pricing practices have come 
under increasing (and increasingly critical) policy scrutiny as 
they are seen to distort competition by allowing certain ﬁrms 
to compete unfairly by exploiting loopholes ensuing from the 
absence of a uniﬁed ﬁscal policy across EU Members.32 Thus, 
the EU Commission has started a number of investigations 
under its state aid rules to ensure that these mechanisms do 
not grant unfair advantages to certain ﬁrms operating in the 
EU nor act as market-distorting subsidies (Box 3).
BOX 3:
European Union State Aid Doctrine
Under EU law, subsidies may fall into two categories—(i) market-correcting subsidies, which aim at redressing or adjusting market 
failures such as information asymmetries, income inequality, and the like; and (ii) market-distorting subsidies, which affect 
competition by providing an unfair advantage to the recipients of the subsidy. From a services trade perspective, discussions to 
date on how to distinguish the above two categories have not been conclusive, as little information on state practices is generally 
available at the EU level. However, the regulatory framework implemented by the EU in its internal market can provide useful 
insights.
Because markets can be distorted not only by the anti-competitive conduct of companies, but also distortive state interventions, 
including state subsidies, state aid control is a key instrument in the EU’s competition toolbox.33 In pursuing its internal market 
aims, the EU has adopted a state aid control system that gives the European Commission power to vet the granting of government 
subsidies to companies.34 Pursuant to such rules, which aim at preventing the distortion of competition that would ensue if a 
national government were to grant advantages or incentives to particular companies, the European Commission has recently 
exercised its right to explore certain advantageous ﬁscal practices to determine if they could be deemed prohibited subsidies 
under the EU’s state aid doctrine.35 Indeed, Article 107 of the TFEU prohibits state aid when government support to a speciﬁc EU 
undertaking gains an advantage in relation to its competitors in the EU internal market, distorting competition.36 In other words, 
subsidies that distort competition are prohibited unless they target speciﬁc EU objectives (for example, environmental aid, regional 
development, research and development [R&D] promotion) and distortions of competition and trade remain at an acceptable 
level.37 
According to EU state aid rules, any support that is conferred on a selective basis and leads to an advantage can qualify as state 
aid.38 This deﬁnition bears some degree of resemblance to the deﬁnition of subsidies found in the WTO’s ASCM as it refers to 
all forms of ﬁnancial transfers from state bodies to public or private companies that give these companies an advantage over 
their competitors.39 However, contrary to the ASCM, which, as a component of the GATT, applies solely to trade in goods, the EU 
state aid deﬁnition also applies to services. Much public debate has been heard on ongoing investigations carried out by the EU 
Commission on tax rulings applied to goods companies such as Starbucks, Fiat, and Apple and to services multinationals such as 
Amazon, Google, and Apple (for its music download business) in an attempt to verify whether they qualify as illegal state aids or 
not.
WTO Document S/WPGR/W/25, p. 2.
La Repubblica (2015).
Irish Times (2014). 
Irish Times (2014).
Van der Wee (2011: 2, 4).
La Repubblica (2015).
Van der Wee (2011: 11).
Guardian (2014).
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6Contrary to commonly held perceptions, subsidy measures 
affecting trade in services are not excluded from the realm of 
application of the GATS. Several GATS provisions guarantee 
a certain level of discipline to subsidies in services trade.40 
GATS Art. II (MFN treatment) applies to services subsidies 
insofar as they are measures by Members affecting trade in 
services, pursuant to Art. I (Scope and Deﬁnition). Moreover, 
in sectors, sub-sectors, and/or modes of supply in which a 
Member has scheduled a GATS commitment, Art. XVII (NT) 
disciplines also apply to subsidy practices. Subsidies must 
be granted on a national treatment basis unless limitations 
have been speciﬁcally inscribed in a Member’s schedule of 
commitments. 
As regulatory transparency can play a crucial role in 
understanding how pervasive government intervention can 
be in services trade, GATS Art. III (Transparency) can also be 
considered among the existing GATS disciplines addressing 
services subsidies. While at times couched in soft, hortatory 
terms, GATS Art. VIII on Monopolies and Exclusive Suppliers 
and GATS Art. IX on Business Practises bear some relevance 
in a subsidy context insofar as they draw attention to the 
role of government ownership and regulation in generating 
effects similar to trade-distorting subsidies.41 GATS Art. VIII 
is also relevant given its stated objective of preventing cross-
subsidization from occurring across activities or sectors.42 
Finally, subsidies in trade in services may also be disciplined 
under Art. XXIII:3 dealing with non-violation complaints, so 
far as subsidies not in explicit violation of GATS provisions 
might still be shown to nullify or impair beneﬁts ﬂowing 
from—or expected of—a Member’s speciﬁc commitments.43 
If disciplines on subsidies already exist within the realm of 
the GATS, the question is what policy rationale lay behind 
the decision of GATS negotiators to seek agreement on 
elaborate additional disciplines under the Art. XV negotiating 
mandate? Such a rationale can be traced to the need felt by 
negotiators to distinguish between subsidies that provide an 
unfair trade advantage and those that are granted in pursuit 
of legitimate public policy objectives, such as those aimed 
at correcting market failures, securing compliance with 
important regulatory objectives, and so on.44 
As noted, a handful of technically complex and politically 
contentious issues were left on the GATS negotiating 
table when the curtain fell on the Uruguay Round, with 
the promise these issues would be taken up once the WTO 
was up and running. The GATS leftover menu was a rich 
one, covering as it did (and still does) non-discriminatory 
domestic regulation (necessity), emergency safeguards, 
government procurement, and subsidies.
Art. XV of the GATS calls on WTO Members to negotiate 
with a view to developing necessary multilateral disciplines 
to avoid the trade-distortive effects that Members recognize 
subsidies may have on trade in services. In contrast to 
the mandate foreseen under GATS Art. X on emergency 
safeguard measures, for which a speciﬁc time-frame was 
initially foreseen (if never actually met), the negotiating 
mandate on subsidies under Art. XV GATS was from the 
outset open ended in character. This distinction suggests 
an early assumption on the part of GATS negotiators of the 
difﬁculty that rallying a multilateral consensus on the issue of 
services subsidies represented. 
Twenty years after the WTO’s launch, negotiations within 
the WPGR on the Art. XV mandate have little to show. 
For starters, Members have been unable to agree on the 
very substantive perimeter of their discussions, with no 
NOT EXACTLY STARTING 
FROM SCRATCH: 
EXISTING GATS 
DISCIPLINES APPLICABLE 
TO SUBSIDIES
NEGOTIATING SUBSIDY 
DISCIPLINES: LESSONS 
LEARNED
Van der Wee (2011: 5).
Poretti (2008: 467).
Van der Wee (2011: 2).
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7universally accepted deﬁnition of the term “subsidy” in a 
services trade context emerging from the Working Party’s 
deliberations. While use of the deﬁnition found in Art. 1 
of the ASCM appears to carry the favour of most WTO 
Members, negotiations on services subsidies have been 
marred to this day by the absence of a commonly agreed 
deﬁnition of what a service subsidy is and the typology of 
measures to which the called-for disciplines would apply. 
Further evidence of the collective revealed preference 
for regulatory inaction can be adduced by the desultory 
results of WPGR calls for the exchange of information on 
Members’ subsidy practices in services, an essential ﬁrst 
step in mapping the nature, modal and sectoral incidence of 
government support measures to which subsidy disciplines 
would apply. It would also distinguish the trade- and 
investment-distortive effects to which prospective disciplines 
could respond.  
At the end of 2013, only ﬁve WTO Members had responded 
to the questionnaire designed by the WTO Secretariat for the 
information exchange foreseen under the Art. XV negotiating 
mandate—Norway, New Zealand, Hong Kong China, Poland, 
and Switzerland. Such a demonstrated lack of willingness to 
collate and share publicly available information anchored in 
state budgets attests to WTO Members’ second thoughts 
after the Uruguay Round on the desirability of fulﬁlling the 
GATS Art. XV mandate.45 
Beyond Art. XV, the GATS Art. VI:4 negotiating mandate, 
which calls for the adoption of a necessity test allowing 
to gauge the potentially unduly burdensome impact or 
disguised restriction to trade that non-discriminatory 
regulatory measures relating to qualiﬁcation requirements 
and procedures, licensing requirements, and technical 
standards might represent, is also relevant to the discussion 
on subsidies. The regulatory intensity of services is well 
known. Indeed, as for Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures, domestic 
regulation forms the very currency of negotiations in 
services, with many behind-the-border measures at play 
in negotiations that do not fall within the scope of Art. XVI 
(Market Access) and XVII (National Treatment).46 Such 
measures are at times closely linked to subsidies so far as 
cross-subsidization and tax/subsidy/incentive schemes rank 
among the various forms of domestic support measures 
enacted by governments to favour certain (typically local) 
suppliers (except in the case of investment incentives 
whose beneﬁciaries are foreign suppliers).47 Also, just as 
for subsidies, domestic regulation is an essential means of 
pursuing a number of legitimate policy objectives whose 
implementation, in certain circumstances, might also 
generate trade- or investment-distortive or restrictive 
effects. 
Agreeing on the elements of a necessity test, without 
which WTO Members will not be able to fulﬁl the mandate 
foreseen under GATS Art. VI:4, would allow a line to be 
drawn between legitimate regulatory intervention, even 
that carrying potentially trade-restrictive effects (what 
Alan Sykes once called “efﬁcient protection”), and outright 
protectionism.48 As with subsidy disciplines for services trade 
(including investment), whose existence is seen in many 
public policy circles as an undue constraint on policymaking, 
the absence of an agreed necessity test for services 
showcases a similar reluctance of (often powerful) national 
regulatory authorities to see their vertical turf challenged 
by what they often portray as poorly conceived, lowest 
common denominator, and horizontal (that is, sector-blind) 
trade policy constructs. Fears that a horizontal necessity 
test could curtail the policy ﬂexibility national regulators 
currently enjoy and constrain their domestic regulatory 
prerogatives lie behind the Art. VI:4 stalemate.49 
Ironically, the reluctance is most strongly felt in the US 
(and in several Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development [OECD] countries), whose world leading 
service providers rank among the most likely victims 
of disproportionate or unduly burdensome regulatory 
conduct in foreign markets, but whose multiplicity of (often 
independent) domestic regulators also rank among the most 
turf protective of public ofﬁcials.
WTO Document (2011),  p. 2.
WTO Document (2011), p. 1.
Delimatsis (2008: 371).
Delimatsis (2008: 390).
Poretti (2009:  253).
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The lack of progress in negotiations on subsidy disciplines for 
services trade can be ascribed to several factors. These range 
from the intrinsic nature of services to a host of political 
economy considerations. 
Differences in the nature, deﬁnitional boundaries (for 
example, the need in services for factor movement), and 
regulatory intensity between services and goods trade 
have played a signiﬁcant role in imparting greater technical 
complexity to subsidy discussions in services relative to those 
prevailing at the time that the ASCM took shape. Contrary 
FACTORS INFLUENCING 
NEGOTIATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLE XV
8to goods, which are essentially tangible (hence more easily 
traceable and measurable), storable, and traded (for trade 
law purposes) through one mode of supply, cross-border 
commerce, services are intangible (hence far more difﬁcult to 
measure), non-storable, typically involve factor movement, 
and can be traded in three other modes beyond cross-border 
trade (that is, consumption abroad; commercial presence; 
and movement of service suppliers). 
The above differences assume special relevance in the 
context of countervailing duty determinations since, as 
pointed out by Poretti (2008), the multi-modal nature of 
services singularly heightens the complexity of constructing 
a proper metric of injury and establishing a causal link 
between injury and subsidies at a sufﬁciently disaggregated 
“like” service or service-provider level beyond reasonable 
doubt (for emergency safeguard measures). The above 
difﬁculties further complicate attempts at determining the 
origin of traded services.50 
As noted, deﬁning subsidies in a services context is more 
troublesome than in a goods setting due to the signiﬁcantly 
greater role (indeed all-encompassing in the absence of 
tariffs or other price-based instruments of border protection) 
played by domestic regulation in trade in services. Extending 
the deﬁnition of services subsidies into the regulatory 
domain, something WTO Members have shown little political 
appetite for, would raise complex boundary challenges of 
identiﬁcation and measurement of subsidies emanating 
from domestic regulatory measures (for example, reserve 
requirements in banking; land ownership restrictions 
in tourism or construction and engineering services; or 
consumer protection restrictions in land transport).51 
 
Three additional features of services trade can be seen as 
potential inhibiting factors to the successful negotiation 
of disciplines on services subsidies—(i) factor mobility; 
(ii) the preponderance of small and medium-sized service 
companies; and (iii) the signiﬁcant role of SOEs in services. 
The factor movement that is a distinguishing feature of 
services trade acts as a potentially signiﬁcant hurdle to 
the development of disciplines on subsidies in service 
industries. As shown earlier, governments tend to favour 
the preservation of as much policy space as possible in their 
quest to attract and retain foreign investment (particularly in 
federal states), and to enhance the supply and employment 
prospects of local talent that is important to the growth 
prospects of ﬁrms in knowledge industries. 
In a world where globalization and new technologies have 
contributed to the fragmentation of value chains, a process 
that was once the exclusive province of manufacturing 
but which today engulfs much of the service economy, 
there has been a worldwide intensiﬁcation of locational 
competition over efﬁciency-seeking FDI that is so central to 
value chain dynamics. With ever more ﬁrms, including small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs; not least because the 
minimum efﬁcient scale of operation is signiﬁcantly smaller 
in services than it is in manufacturing), from ever more 
countries integrating and beneﬁting from GVCs, governments 
(in both OECD and developing countries) today display 
increased reluctance to tie their hands and be bound by 
disciplines on services subsidies for fear that it could result 
in reducing their ability to provide the cocktail of incentives 
needed to enter and move up value chains. 
While one can easily applaud the democratizing gains that 
come in the wake of a more globally contestable world 
economy, such gains paradoxically raise the market premium 
on policy space and its preservation (Box 4).
BOX 4:
Ascendant Developing Country Exports and Demand for Policy Space
Globalization and the digital revolution that have characterised the 20 years since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round have vastly 
increased the participation of small business enterprises, including ﬁrms from least developed countries in world services trade, 
a process that may well have also contributed to a reduced political demand for subsidy disciplines in the sector. The dramatic 
reduction in distance—the end of gravity—that the digital revolution is progressively making possible has vastly increased 
opportunities for ﬁrms that typically operate on a smaller scale to enter the growing market for remotely supplied services. It has 
allowed a growing number of developing countries, big and small  (India, the Philippines, Colombia, Kenya, Rwanda, Vietnam, 
and Mauritius, to name a few), to specialize in the supply of a multiplicity of business and professional services. In unleashing 
their services trade potential, governments have had increasing recourse to a host of policy instruments such as tax incentives, 
direct subsidies, and domestic regulation to attract and retain investments; upgrading their connectivity infrastructures (logistics, 
communications, and establishment of free zones); upgrading their human capital through enhanced vocational and tertiary 
training; and fostering services exports through improved promotional support. Developing countries have in recent years 
signiﬁcantly expanded support to domestic ﬁrms in their quest to move up regional and GVCs. As developing disciplines on 
services subsidies may imply that governments have to abandon or curtail their use of such a policy toolbox, many WTO Members 
(not only in the developing world) seem to refrain from engaging more actively in developing such disciplines.
WTO document S/WPGR/W/9, para. 8.
Poretti (2008: 480–83).
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9From a trade policy perspective, the guarantees and support, 
both implicit and explicit, conferred to SOEs can be likened 
to subsidization as such measures can distort competition 
by way of directed forms of regulatory or market access 
favoritism through preferential purchasing, commercial 
benevolence, and direct ﬁnancial support by the home 
state.52
  
SOEs are heavily represented in services markets—from 
aviation to energy, banking, and telecommunications.53 
Understanding if and how disciplines on SOEs are desirable 
and/or feasible in a services trade context is thus of some 
importance to any discussion of subsidy disciplines in the 
sector.
As mentioned, the GATS features a provision disciplining 
possible abusive or competition-impairing practices by SOEs, 
Art. VIII on Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers. 
Pursuant to Art. VIII:1 and 2, any monopoly service supplier 
is required to observe the MFN principle when supplying a 
monopoly service in a relevant market, and when competing 
in the supply of a service outside its monopoly rights 
in a sector subject to speciﬁc commitments, it shall not 
abuse its monopoly privileges, for instance, through cross-
subsidization practices. Assessing the effectiveness of Art. VIII 
in curtailing the anti-competitive practices of SOEs is quite 
NEW KID ON THE RULE-
MAKING BLOCK? STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES
The rise of larger emerging markets where the state has 
come to play a signiﬁcant leadership role in the economic 
landscape can also be considered an additional inhibiting 
factor in the lack of progress of negotiations under the GATS 
Art. XV mandate. In a rising number of emerging economies, 
as has long been the case in a number of developed 
economies, the state continues to be a predominant player, 
both passively through the growth of sovereign wealth funds 
and more actively as an owner-operator in key sectors such 
as telecommunications, banking, insurance, or air transport 
services. Such predominance, which an absence of codiﬁed 
multilateral rules has clearly facilitated, also ﬁnds its political 
economy anchored in a preference for policy space that rules 
on subsidies would be likely to constrain. This can be seen 
from the strong push by the US and others to codify and 
establish a juridical precedent for such rules in a number of 
mega-regional and plurilateral initiatives from which major 
emerging countries—the implicit target of those disciplines—
are notably absent.   
challenging as no dispute centered on this provision has ever 
been prosecuted before the WTO’s judicial organs.
The desirability and feasibility of new rules on SOEs are 
currently under discussion in different negotiating fora, 
including plurilateral and mega-regional negotiations 
addressing trade in services. For example, the EU has recently 
put forward a draft text on state-owned enterprises in the 
context of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) negotiations aimed at addressing the harmful effects 
of SOEs stemming from undue advantages.54 According 
to the proposal, the TTIP Chapter on State Enterprises, 
Enterprises Granted Special or Exclusive Rights or Privileges 
would apply only to sectors where the parties undertook 
speciﬁc negotiated commitments, and provisions drawn 
from GATS Art. VIII: 1, 2 and 5 would be incorporated by 
reference into the body of the TTIP. Mirroring the widely held 
view that government ownership per se is not problematic, 
the EU proposal speciﬁes that the TTIP would not prevent 
the parties from establishing or maintaining SOEs. It would, 
however, feature an obligation requiring the parties to refrain 
from requiring or encouraging SOEs to act inconsistently 
with the TTIP. Provisions on Non-discrimination (Art. 4) 
and Commercial Considerations (Art. 5) are also included 
in the EU proposal,55 which aims to ensure that SOEs with 
monopoly powers or special rights do not discriminate 
against private companies.56 
The OECD has also in recent years engaged in a policy 
discussion on the impact of SOEs on economy-wide 
performance. Its work on the relationship between SOEs 
and corporate governance led to the development of the 
principle of “competitive neutrality,” which is deemed to 
obtain when “no entity operating in an economic market is 
subject to undue competitive advantages or disadvantages.”57 
As no mechanism is currently in place within the OECD to 
ensure compliance with the above principle, enterprises 
that receive governmental support continue to enjoy net 
advantages over their private business competitors.58 
Stephenson and Hufbauer (forthcoming: 5).
OECD (2012: 9).
According to the text of Art. 5, the parties shall ensure that, with the 
exception of the fulﬁllment of public service obligations or public mandate, 
state enterprises and enterprises granted special or exclusive rights or 
privileges act in accordance with commercial considerations in the relevant 
territory in their purchases or supply of services, including when these goods 
or services are supplied to or by an investment of an investor of the other 
Party.
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Coalition of Services Industries and US Chamber of Commerce (2011: 7).
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Can a silver lining be found in the hitherto futile quest for 
subsidy disciplines in services trade? Considering the lack of 
progress that has marred two decades of negotiations in this 
area, the recent debates in the US and the EU over the need 
for the ﬂexible implementation of competition law in the 
context of acute market failure; the ascendency of SOEs in a 
growing subset of emerging trading powers; the reluctance of 
vertical sectoral regulatory institutions to embrace horizontal 
trade disciplines; and the rising political and economic 
value assigned to the preservation of policy space, all would 
appear to conspire against forward movement in disciplining 
subsidies in services trade.
This paper’s candid reading of where we have been and 
why leaves little doubt that prospects for the adoption 
of future multilateral disciplines on services subsidies are 
generally grim. Realistically, it would seem most unlikely 
that governments will make much progress in the near future 
given the singular lack of political will the collective WTO 
membership has displayed towards fulﬁlling the GATS Art. 
XV mandate negotiated more than 20 years ago.  
This paper has emphasized how the very concept of a 
subsidy raises a host of complex issues in services trade 
that are generally not found in a goods trade context, not 
least because subsidy-like effects in services can derive 
from the application of regulatory measures that might not 
necessarily fall under the term “subsidy” as deﬁned under 
the WTO’s ASCM. Certain domestic regulatory measures 
may indeed distort cross-border trade and investment in 
a manner akin to subsidies but others may be justiﬁed as 
they correct market failures or, more generally, are used to 
ensure the adequate delivery of services with public good 
characteristics. 
Disciplines on subsidies that aim at redressing trade 
distortions and unfair advantages should thus logically 
extend to domestic regulations that induce subsidy-like 
effects. Once again, while prospects for seeing such an 
expanded deﬁnitional remit of the term “subsidy” appear 
equally bleak, any step in such a direction would likely require 
the adoption of principles of necessity or proportionality, 
allowing WTO judges to distinguish trade- and investment-
distorting regulations from those that are “no more 
burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of a 
service.” Given, however, the limited traction that discussions 
on necessity have generated under the GATS Art. VI:4 
mandate to date, there can be little doubt over the current 
buoyancy of the “market” for policy space at the interface of 
trade and regulatory policy.
Also, the desultory results generated by the WTO’s 
information exchange exercise on Member states’ subsidy 
practices in services, while theoretically hampered by the 
lack of an agreed deﬁnitional perimeter to report on,61 once 
again reﬂects a clear collective aversion to rule-making 
advances and the concomitant loss of policy space. In a world 
characterized by shortening product cycles and intensifying 
locational competition, the ability to deploy various types 
of governmental assistance measures to an ecosystem 
populated in most countries, and particularly in developing 
ones, by SMEs, is increasingly seen as a necessary element of 
the policy arsenal required to help ﬁrms better navigate the 
waters of regional and global value chains. Fewer countries 
seem prepared today to renounce this opportunity, even if 
it means distorting trade, investment and/or competition 
through the granting of some unfair advantages.
A WAY FORWARD?
According to the Coalition of Services Industries (CSI) in 
the US, the government should propose the inclusion of 
provisions on SOEs and competitive neutrality in the Trans-
Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP) negotiations.59 In particular, the 
CSI suggests that the TPP feature rules requiring the parties 
to have comprehensive competition laws that prohibit 
anti-competitive conduct; provisions that encourage the 
progressive reduction of public ownership stakes in SOEs; 
and non-conforming measures identiﬁed on the basis of a 
negative list approach.60 
Disciplines on SOEs have also been addressed in the context 
of PTAs. For example, Art. 16.3 of the Korea-US free trade 
agreement (FTA) (KORUS) establishes that while nothing 
in the agreement prevents the parties from establishing 
or maintaining a state enterprise, they shall ensure that 
SOEs comply with the obligations of the agreement 
when exercising any regulatory, administrative, or other 
governmental authority that a party has delegated to it. The 
KORUS further calls on SOEs to accord non-discriminatory 
treatment in the sale of goods and/or services to covered 
investments. The EU-Korea FTA went further by requiring, 
under Art. 11.1 of Chapter 11 (Competition), that the parties 
maintain comprehensive competition laws that effectively 
address the abuse of dominance by one or more enterprises 
and provide effective control of concentrations between 
enterprises. The agreement further clariﬁes that competition 
law serves the purpose of preventing the beneﬁts of 
trade liberalization from being nulliﬁed or impaired by 
anti-competitive business conduct or anti-competitive 
transactions.
Coalition of Services Industries and US Chamber of Commerce (2011: 11–
12).
In light of “serviciﬁcation” and the growing fragmentation of value chains, it 
cannot be excluded that certain kinds of governmental support provided to 
services suppliers become embedded in goods and thus possibly subject to 
ASCM disciplines.
Coalition of Services Industries and US Chamber of Commerce (2011: 9).
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This paper’s measured “pessimism” (one might also say its 
realism) towards the successful adoption of multilateral 
disciplines on services subsidies arises also from the 
acknowledgment that with the emergence of developing 
countries, including those where SOEs play a major role in 
key service sectors, negotiations are subject to an alignment 
of political economy forces that are no longer those that 
prevailed two decades ago. The ASCM, like the Uruguay 
Round of which it formed a part, was quite clearly the by-
product of a peculiar, “end of history” moment. It is doubtful 
that such disciplines could easily be replicated today given 
the vastly more questioning attitudes that pervade public 
policy debates on trade and investment liberalization relative 
to those characterizing the heyday of the Washington 
Consensus.  
Although a number of recent or ongoing preferential and 
plurilateral negotiations (for example, TPP, TTIP, Trade in 
Services Agreement [TISA]) are addressing the issue of new 
disciplines on SOEs, and may indeed generate important 
legal precedents able to inﬂuence the future course of 
WTO discussions at the trade, investment, and competition 
interface, one can only bemoan that such discussions do 
not engage the countries, chief among them China and 
other major emerging trade and FDI powers, at which these 
disciplines are primarily aimed. The continued refusal of a 
number of OECD countries, led by the US,  to prevent China 
from taking part in the ongoing TISA discussions where SOE 
disciplines are at play in a setting seeking to maximize the 
agreement’s critical mass, is hardly encouraging of prospects 
for the subsequent multilateralization of WTO-X disciplines 
ﬁrst mooted in preferential settings. 
Can anything be done to overcome the hurdles described 
above? Can a different approach help governments break the 
current logjam? Can a way be found to rekindle an analytical 
journey that takes better stock of today’s reality while also 
acknowledging that a trafﬁc light approach borrowing on 
the precedents set in the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture 
and the ASCM might actually help Members devise efﬁcient 
forms of government support and avoid those that are 
either wasteful, most likely to distort trade and investment 
patterns, or weakly justiﬁed on economic grounds (as may 
be the case of many tax incentives targeting market-seeking 
FDI)? Once more, the answers to the above questions are far 
from simple or straightforward. 
Although a new approach might be desirable, this need 
not imply the abandoning the approach taken so far but an 
expansion of what has already been done. For example, the 
process of information exchanges between governments, 
while admittedly yielding a mediocre analytical harvest to 
date, remains essential to any informed understanding of 
whether, how, and to what extent governments direct various 
forms of state support to their services industries. In seeking 
to reinvigorate this, the scope of questionnaires designed 
almost two decades ago would need to be extended to 
explore a broader subset of support measures,62 including 
domestic regulations, support to SOEs, and monetary and 
exchange rate policies, all of which could be construed to 
induce subsidy-like effects to services and service providers. 
Efforts might also be directed to revisiting the exclusion of air 
transport services from the scope of the GATS, both with a 
view to reassessing the space that may exist for plurilateral 
forms of progressive market opening in a sector that bears 
no resemblance to that in operation when GATS 1.0 was 
devised, and with a view to tackling the manifold market-
distorting practices that characterize global competition in 
air transport services, chief among which relate to SOEs. 
Changes along the lines described above would require WTO 
Members to address the issue of subsidies in services trade 
no longer from the sole perspective of the form state support 
takes, but also from the vantage point of the effects such 
support induce on market competition (an approach akin to 
an “effects” doctrine in competition law).
Finally, and despite this paper’s earlier musings against the 
premature expression of irrational exuberance, it may still 
be useful to strengthen the links between the GATS Art. 
VI:4 and Art. XV negotiating mandates. Discussions on the 
concept of a necessity test would prove undeniably useful to 
the adoption of prospective disciplines on services subsidies 
capable of distinguishing legitimate forms of public support 
from more nefarious or economically equivocal ones. This 
would entail some organizational changes in how the WPGR 
and the Working Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR), 
the respective WTO Working Parties entrusted with the two 
mandates, go about their work. But surely such a challenge 
pales in comparison to the odds that would need to be 
overcome to secure a happy ending to this story.
See WTO Document S/WPGR/W/16.62
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